Markets
worldwide seem intent on ‘not fighting the Fed (all central bank easing)’ to
the exclusion of any concern that valuations may be getting out of whack or
what the consequences may be of unlimited monetary ease.
On the first
point, in an earlier article “Remember, Buy Low, Sell High”, I presented my
arguments for why stocks are in overvalued territory.
As to the second
point, while I am not a trader and, therefore, have a difficult time divorcing
fundamentals (overvalued stocks) from current price levels, I do understand the
liquidity affects that overly easy central bank monetary policy can have on
security prices.
That said, past
periods of excessive Fed supplied liquidity have ended badly; and to date, I
haven’t found anyone that has a clear explanation of what will happen when the
central banks have to start tightening after this unprecedented expansion in
global bank reserves. Nonetheless, I
have a hint. We know what has happened
in the past when the Fed tightened after a period of easy money---100% of the
time, it either tightened too quickly and pushed the economy into recession or it
waited too long and inflation spiked.
Unfortunately,
this time around the Fed’s balance sheet is exponentially more bloated than it has
been in the past. Hence, it seems like
the potential negative consequences in transition to tighter money might also
be larger. I could try to quantify that
potential downside by extrapolating into the present the past experiences when
monetary policy transitioned from easy to tight. But I won’t.
I will simply contend that there are risks and that given the extent of
money expansion, those risks might be higher than experienced in the past.
What has my dandruff up is the
Fed apologists that keep telling me that Bernanke is doing a great job and that
there are no monetary related problems about which to be concerned. I read one such article published on one of
my favorite websites yesterday; and after
bouncing off the ceiling a couple of times, I decided to address what
the authors entitled ‘Everything You Think You Know
About the 'Big Bad Fed' Is Wrong’. :
Here are the
‘misconceptions’ that they attempt to prove wrong. (to be clear, the authors of
the aforementioned article are stating that the bold, italicized statements are
wrong):
(1)
‘printing money increases the money supply’ Well, duh.
Anyone paying attention to the economy and the Fed knows that is not how
monetary policy works; and, hence the authors are correct to say that it is
wrong. What is also correct is that the money
that the Fed is printing goes into bank reserves; and unfortunately, at the
moment those banks are not rushing to lend money (which would create money
supply). So, lots of reserve growth but little
money supply growth. So far, the authors
and I are in agreement.
But it stops
there. Because the Fed is increasing
reserves with the stated intent of increasing money supply. That is done by the banks lending its
reserves which the Fed believes will speed up economic growth and lower
unemployment. The problem is that to
date its policy has been a bust. However,
if we all woke up tomorrow morning and the banks had lent all those reserves
overnight, money supply would explode and Bernanke et al would be wee weeing in
their whitey tighties and scrambling to withdraw those reserves.
So it seems
to be a bit disingenuous to confuse the result (money printing hasn’t increased
money supply---to date) with the intent (printing money increases bank reserves
which will hopefully increase money supply).
Yes, there has been no surge in money supply, but not for wont of
trying.
(2)
‘QE is pumping cash into the stock market’.
OK, not directly. As you know, most of the QE’s to date have
involved the Fed creating money and buying government bonds and mortgages. The authors argue most of those bonds are
bought from banks and a big chunk of that remains as excess reserves.
(a) true
technically. But in QEIII, virtually all bonds bought by the Fed come almost
dollar for dollar from the Treasury though indirectly (the UST
sells the bonds to primary dealers who then sell them to the Fed and make the
vig) to finance our on going trillion dollar deficits ($1 trillion, i.e US
deficit/12 months = $83,33 billion/month---amazingly close to $85 billion per
month wouldn’t you say?). To be sure,
that is not the stock market; but the effect of these purchases are not
benign--but that is a whole other issue.
See (3) below.
(b) the authors
rightfully point out that much of the positive stock market performance is a
derivative of the ‘don’t fight the Fed’ notion; that is, the Fed’s aggressive
monetary action theoretically provides a downside to the economy and that is a
positive for investor psychology which leads to increased stock investments.
However, I
think psychology is secondary. The main
reason investors are flocking to stocks is that the Fed’s zero interest rate
policy isn’t giving them much of a choice. Investors, even conservative fixed
income types (seniors), have no other place but the stock market to put their
money to earn a return. So while QE may
not be directly pumping money into the stock market, it is forcing money into
the stock market via the perversity of zero interest rates. In the process, it is robbing those conservative
investors, enriching the banks and encouraging the misallocation of capital.
(c) if you
think the big banks are sitting on all those reserves and not doing anything
with them (cough, prop trading, cough), I have a bridge in Brooklyn
that I will sell you cheap.
(3)
‘QE will create runaway inflation’. I agree with the authors that this is not
likely---the runaway part, that is. And they acknowledge that the
inflationistas have been lowering their own dire prognostications. However, that doesn’t mean the economy won’t
suffer from another round of Fed induce inflation. So how about ‘QE may create high inflation’? I am not arguing Weimar Republic/Zimbabwe
level inflation. But I will argue that
based on history, the Fed has never, ever extricated itself from an easy money
policy without either (a) starting to tighten too soon which led to an economic
slowdown if not recession or (b) waiting too long which led to higher than
generally acceptable levels of inflation.
So maybe it should be QE will not create runaway inflation but it
will likely lead to either recession or higher inflation’.
The authors pooh
pooh the notion that inflation could still occur as a result of current Fed
policy. And you know what? They could be right. However, they fail to note that Bernanke has
stated that one of the signs that QE is working is.........drum
roll---inflation. Of course, what
Bernanke means is just a little bit of inflation. But what if he is wrong and ‘a little bit’
turns out to be a whole lot. Assuming the
Fed is smart enough to fine tune its results I believe is a dangerous
assumption. As proof I suggest that you
check on Bernanke’s statement about the health of the housing market mere
months before that bubble blew up.
In other
words, what the authors fail to address is that at some point in time, a day, a
month, a year, a decade from now, the Fed will have to (a) stop buying $85
billion a month in governments and mortgages, then (b) start removing all those
reserves from bank balance sheets. And
what happens then? To be sure, if the US
economy continues to grow at a sub par pace into infinity, the task may be
postponed or rendered moot. But that is not the Fed’s stated intent; and assuming
that it takes all steps necessary to goose the economy (have banks lend those
reserves) and the economy begins to grow, then what happens?
So,
notwithstanding the authors discounting the argument that nothing has happened ‘yet’,
in truth ‘yet’ hasn’t happened yet. But
more importantly, they offer no useful explanation of how the reduction of this
massive accumulation of reserves is going to be executed without causing
problems when, as and if the economy ever picks up steam except to say that
investors will ultimately come to understand how the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy works.
But I have an
add-on question. How much larger can the
Fed balance sheet get before it is forced to do something? After all, if the
balance sheet keeps growing, at some point in time even a 5 or 10 basis point
move up in rates (down in prices) will destroy the entire Fed highly leveraged equity
position. Now I know that in its
infinite wisdom that the Fed has already dealt with the accounting issue, i.e.
it excused itself from recognizing capital losses. But will investors be that forgiving? I don’t know.
My point is that no one else knows the answers to the above inflation
related questions; and that is a problem for which the Fed is directly
response.
Furthermore as
I noted above, the current QE is basically buying all the new debt issued by
the Treasury to finance our deficit. And
that deficit funds what? Solyndra,
Fisker, federal employee salaries and benefits, war, ethanol and other agricultural
subsidies. What do you suppose the
inflationary impact is of all that extra inexpensive money courtesy of the Fed being
pumped into the economy funding nonessential, inefficient projects, regulations,
useless federal employees and defense materiel?
(4)
‘QE causes high oil prices’. Hmmm. I
haven’t heard this one; but the authors got me on it anyway. Technically, they are correct---from the
initial date of inception of the QE’s, oil prices may be up a little but not
much and nothing about which to complain.
However, check the history of monetary ease, i.e. QE by another name. Oil and food prices almost always start
moving up when the Fed over stimulates or over stays its stimulus
policies.
A big reason
this isn’t happening with oil right now is because of the fracking revolution
in this country which has added significantly to the supply of oil while the
sluggishly growing economy has held back demand. On the
other hand, have you been to the grocery store lately?
And not to be
repetitious, but no one can say definitely what the impact of QE on oil prices will
have been until QE is over.
(5)
‘QE has debased the dollar’. No, the Fed has debased the dollar and has
been doing so since the date of its inception.
Burns, Miller, Greenspan et al, they all did it long before anyone ever
heard of QE or Bernanke---he is just the latest. Sure there have been periods of dollar
appreciation, like when Volcker SHRANK money supply (excuse me, bank reserves). And yes, the dollar is doing fine right now;
but more because the rest of the world is such a mess and the US
just happens to be the cleanest shirt in the dirty laundry---so funds are
flowing into dollar denominated assets.
In the end,
the cold hard facts are that our Fed has a long history of debasing the dollar
primary via an overly accommodative monetary policy; and anyone who argues that
current Fed policy (QE) is not overly accommodative may need to rethink that
position.
The
bottom line here is (a) the Fed’s balance sheet is bloated by any measure, (b)
that hasn’t had negative effects to date, but not because the Ber-nank isn’t
moving heaven and earth in a hopeless attempt to squeeze something positive out
a hugely expansionary monetary policy, (c) nobody, including me, knows how this
chapter in Fed policy is going to end, because we are in totally uncharted
waters, (d) however, a review of monetary history points to numerous examples
of easy money leading to economic difficulties (e) nevertheless, I am not
arguing that it will end badly, (f) rather I am arguing that current Fed policy
has created sufficient potential risks to the economy that it should be held
accountable not only for creating those risks but also the consequences of its
actions and (g) finally, the history of QE has yet to be written. I think it unproductive to assume that
because nothing untoward has occurred to date as a result of current Fed policy
that nothing untoward will ever happen as a result of current Fed policy.
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